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STATEMENT OF PARTIES 
The parties are listed in the caption. In this brief, Plaintiff Stephen A. Giusti is 
referred to as "Plaintiff Giusti." Former defendant SunGard Data Systems, Inc. is referred 
to as "SunGard" or "SDS." Defendant Sterling Wentworth Corporation is referred to as 
"SWC" or "SES". Defendants John Hyde and Paul Erickson are referred to as "Hyde" 
and "Erickson." All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal exists pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(k). The appeal is from a 
final judgment entered July 10, 2007 in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, Judge L.A. Dever presiding. Add. 13. Plaintiff Giusti filed his 
Notice of Appeal on August 6, 2007. Add. 14. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in dismissing SunGard for lack of personal 
jurisdiction and in denying Plaintiff Giusti's requests for specific discovery on the issue, 
where the court considered matters outside the pleadings, failed to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing, resolved the parties' conflicting evidence against Plaintiff, and where Plaintiff 
made a prima facie showing of general and/or specific personal jurisdiction? Standard 
of Appellate Review: The propriety of the dismissal of a defendant based on lack of 
personal jurisdiction is a question of law which the appellate court reviews for 
correctness, giving no deference to the district court's ruling. Fenn v. Meads Enterprises, 
Inc., 2006 UT 8, ^7, 137 P.3d 706; Ho v. Jim's Enterprises, 2001 UT 63, TJ6, 29 P.3d 633. 
The district court's denial of discovery regarding personal jurisdiction is reviewed for 
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abuse of discretion. THAgr. & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Group Ltd. 416 
F.Supp.2d 1054, 1073-1074 (D. Kan. 2006). Preservation of Issue: R.206-239; 562-568; 
614-619; 633-675; 708-717; 742-743; 4477, at 23:25-31:9. 
2. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment and dismissing 
Plaintiff Giusti's contract claims in Counts II-IV and in limiting the damages on 
Plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claim in Count I, based on its incorrect conclusion that 
the S WC Agreement bars the contract claims and precludes Plaintiff from recovering 
damages incurred after the termination of his employment, where: (1) §7.3 of the SWC 
Agreement allows Plaintiff to rely on SWC's representation of employment for a 
minimum term of 12 months contained in the parties' prior November 7 Contract; (2) 
Plaintiff did not agree to modify the November 7 Contract provision granting him a 
specified term of employment by signing the SWC Agreement; (3) Plaintiff claims that 
the SWC Agreement and his other employment contracts with SWC were fraudulently 
induced; (4) At-will status, termination of employment and/or the presence of an 
integration clause do not bar an employee's claims for fraudulent inducement, and where 
(5) genuinely disputed issues of material fact remain for trial on these claims. Standard 
of Review: The district court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness, granting no deference to the district court. Swan Creek Village Homeowners 
Association v. Warm, 2006 UT 22, [^16, 134 P.3d 1122; Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, 
TJ15, 57 P.3d 997. Preservation of Issue: R.348-352, 357-397; 568-595; 2158-2226; 
2252-2263; 3952-3991; 4477, 31:10-44:8, 77:18-87:3. 
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3. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff Giusti's 
claims in Count I against SunGard, SWC, Hyde and Erickson for fraudulently inducing 
him to leave his employment at Cambric and accept employment and employment 
contracts with SWC, based on the court's incorrect conclusion that Plaintiff failed to 
make a prima facie showing of damages on this claim, where the district court: (1) 
incorrectly limited the damages recoverable on Plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claims 
based on its incorrect conclusion that Plaintiff Giusti was an "at-will" employee; (2) 
improperly discounted Plaintiffs evidence of consequential financial, reputational and 
emotional damages incurred as the result of the alleged fraudulent inducement; (3) 
incorrectly resolved genuinely disputed issues of material fact concerning the damages 
incurred by Plaintiff against him, and (4) incorrectly placed the burden to prove the 
affirmative defense of mitigation of damages on Plaintiff Giusti instead of Defendants? 
Standard of Appellate Review: The district court's decision to grant summary 
judgment is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the district court and 
recognizing that "summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuinely 
disputed issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Swan Creek Village Homeowners Association v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, 
f 16, 134 P.3d 1122; Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, {^15, 57 P.3d 997. Whether a district 
court applied the correct rule for measuring damages is a question of law that is reviewed 
for correctness. Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, {^25, 96 P.3d 893 
(citations omitted). Preservation of Issue: R.3666-3712, 2938-3620; 3739-3828; 3835-
3 
3841; 3957-3958; 3880-3882; 3883-3905; 3931-3938; 4477, 87:4-88:15; 108:13-113:5; 
117:8-126:17, 130:22-131:2. 
4. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff 
Giusti's claim in Count V against Hyde and Erickson for intentional interference with his 
existing and prospective economic relations with SWC, SunGard and other prospective 
employers, where genuinely disputed issues of material fact remain for trial on this claim 
and Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law? Standard of Appellate 
Review: The district court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness, giving no deference to the district court. Swan Creek Village Homeowners 
Association v. Warm, 2006 UT 22,1J16, 134 P.3d 1122; Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, 
t l 5 , 57 P.3d 997. Preservation of Issue: R.3712-3716, 2938-3620; 4477, 89:3-97:18. 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann., §§78-27-22 through 78-27-24, Addendum 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature Of The Case 
Plaintiff Giusti asserts claims for damages against SunGard, SWC, Hyde and 
Erickson for fraudulently inducing him to leave his prior employment at Cambric and 
accept employment and oral and written contracts of employment, pursuant to which 
Plaintiff was employed as Vice President of Sales at SWC in Salt Lake City, Utah, from 
December 1, 1999 until the termination of his employment on May 12, 2000. Plaintiff 
Giusti also asserts claims against SWC for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing and breach of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Plaintiff 
4 
Giusti also claims damages from Hyde and Erickson for intentional interference with his 
employment contract and prospective economic relations with SWC, SunGard and other 
prospective employers. See, Counts I-V, First Amended Complaint, Add. 16, R.73-78. 
II Course of Proceedings And Disposition In The Lower Court 
The course of proceedings relevant to the issues on appeal includes the following: 
1. Plaintiff Giusti filed his original Complaint and Jury Demand on July 10, 
2000. Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand (hereinafter, "FAC") 
on August 9, 2000. R.l-41, 58-98. On August 23, 2000 Hyde and Erickson filed an 
Answer. R. 101-125. 
2. On August 23, 2000 SunGard filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. R. 173-198. On October 2, 2000 Plaintiff Giusti filed a memorandum 
opposing the motion, including a request to conduct specific discovery to show that 
SunGard is subject to the general and/or specific jurisdiction of the district court. R.206-
339; Giusti Aff., TJ63, R.292-293 (discovery request). As Exhibit 2 to this memorandum, 
Plaintiff Giusti filed a Verification of his First Amended Complaint, Add. 16, R.265-266. 
SunGard filed a reply memorandum on October 23, 2000. R.43 5-447. 
3. On August 23, 2000 SWC filed a motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff s claims, 
R. 142-172, and Hyde and Erickson filed a motion to dismiss Counts I-VI. R. 126-143. 
On October 2, 2000 Plaintiff Giusti filed opposition memoranda, R.340-397, 398-427, 
and on October 23, 2000, SWC and Hyde and Erickson filed their reply memoranda. 
R.470-480, 481-506. 
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4. On December 12, 2000 the district court held oral argument but no 
evidentiary hearing on the Defendants' motions to dismiss. The court orally granted 
SunGard's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without allowing Plaintiff 
Giusti's requested discovery on the issue. See, Oral Argument Tr., 52:14-18, R.4477. 
During the oral argument, Defendants argued that their remaining motions to dismiss 
Plaintiffs claims should be treated as summary judgment motions and the district court 
allowed the parties to submit additional briefing, affidavits and evidence on the motions 
and did not subsequently exclude this material. Id. at 56:21-59:18, R.4477. 
5. On December 19, 2000 Defendants filed supplemental memoranda on their 
motions to dismiss, R.527-561. On December 27, 2000 Plaintiff Giusti filed supplemental 
memoranda in opposition, including a request that the district court reconsider its 
dismissal of SunGard. R.562-595. On January 2, 2001, the district court entered a written 
Order, Add.2, R.596-599, granting SunGard's motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction based on findings of fact in which the district court improperly weighed and 
resolved the parties' conflicting evidence on the issue against Plaintiff Giusti. 
6. Based on new evidence, Plaintiff Giusti filed a motion for an order 
requiring the production of information and documents regarding SunGard's activities in 
Utah on October 12, 2001. R.668-671, 633-667. On October 26, 2001 Defendants filed 
an opposition memorandum. R.679-689. On November 7, 2001 Plaintiff Giusti filed his 
reply memorandum. R.690-700. Plaintiff filed a Notice To Submit for Decision on 
November 9, 2001, R.701-702. The district court denied the motion by an Order dated 
March 30, 2002, at 3,4, Add.3, R.705-706. 
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7. On March 30, 2002 the district court entered an Order, Add.3, R.703-307, 
granting SWC's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Giusti's contract claims in 
Counts II through IV and limiting Plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claim in Count I. 
8. On April 10, 2002 Plaintiff Giusti filed a Motion For Relief from Order, 
requesting the district court to reconsider its dismissal of SunGard. R.708-711, 712-717. 
On April 26, 2002, SunGard filed an opposition memorandum. R.745-758. 
9. On April 15, 2002 SWC, Hyde and Erickson filed an Answer to Plaintiffs 
First Amended Complaint. R.718-741. 
10. On April 19, 2002 Plaintiff Giusti filed a motion in the Utah Court of 
Appeals for leave to file an interlocutory appeal of the district court's order dismissing 
SunGard for lack of personal jurisdiction. R.742-743. On April 23, 2002, the Court of 
Appeals transferred the motion to the Utah Supreme Court, which denied the motion for 
the interlocutory appeal on June 14, 2002. R.744, 822-823. 
11. On April 23, 2003 Plaintiff Giusti filed a motion to dismiss Count VI 
(intentional infliction of emotional distress), R.2086-2090, and the motion was granted by 
the district court on May 5, 2003. R.2102-2103. 
12. On July 28, 2003 the district court entered an order, in part, requesting 
Plaintiff Giusti to brief the issue of whether his claims for breach of contract survive the 
district court's order of April 1, 2002 (sic) (actually March 30, 2002), dismissing Counts 
II-IV. See, TJC, R.2150. On August 8, 2003 Plaintiff filed a memorandum regarding the 
status of his breach of contract claims. R.2102-2103. Defendants filed an opposition 
memorandum on August 15, 2003. R.2230-2251. Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum on 
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August 22, 2003, R.2252-2263, and Defendants filed an objection to the reply 
memorandum on August 28, 2003. R.2266-2273. On September 4, 2003 the district court 
entered an Order stating that the intent of its Order of March 30, 2002 was to dismiss 
Counts II-IV in their entirety. R.2277-2279. 
13. On November 2, 2004 SWC, Hyde and Erickson filed a motion for 
summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims for fraudulent inducement in Count I and 
intentional interference in Count V. R.273 8-2741, 2745-2923. On December 13 and 20, 
2004, Plaintiff filed his opposition memorandum. R.2937-3609, 3610-3620. On January 
11, 2005, Defendants filed their reply memorandum. R.3621-3640. 
14. On June 30, 2005 the district court held oral argument on Defendants' 
motions to dismiss Counts I and V. The court granted Plaintiffs motion to publish all 
depositions in the record and requested Plaintiff to file a reformatted memorandum. 
R.3664-3665. On July 5, 2005 Plaintiff Giusti filed a reformatted memorandum in 
opposition to the motion. R.3666-3729. On September 19, 2005 the district court issued 
an Order, Add.8, R.3733-3738, requesting further briefing on Plaintiffs damages for 
fraudulent inducement in Count I and dismissing Plaintiffs tortious interference claim 
against Hyde and Erickson in Count V. 
15. On September 23, 2005 Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to supplement the 
record regarding damages on Plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claim in Count I. R.3739-
3829. On October 5, 2005 SWC, Hyde and Erickson filed an opposition memorandum. 
R.3830-3834. On October 6, 2005 Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum. R.3835-3841. On 
November 10, 2005 the district court granted Plaintiffs motion. R.3880-3882. 
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16. On February 6, 2006 the district court heard oral argument on the 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count I (fraudulent inducement). R.3915. 
On April 21, 2006 the district court entered an Order, Add. 9, R.3922-3626, granting the 
motion based on Plaintiff Giusti's purported failure to produce any evidence of damages 
and dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice. On May 23, 2006 Plaintiff filed 
objections to the Order. R.3931-3938. 
17. On October 25, 2006 Plaintiff Giusti filed objections to Defendants' 
proposed Order granting summary judgment on Count I and dismissing Plaintiffs 
Complaint with prejudice. R.3952-3991. On November 14, 2006 Defendants filed their 
response to Plaintiffs objections. R.3992-3998. On November 17, 2006 the district court 
entered an Order, Add. 10, R.3999-4002, granting summary judgment on Count I and 
dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice. 
18. On December 18, 2006 SWC, Hyde and Erickson filed a motion for 
attorney fees. R.4145-4147. Plaintiff Giusti filed an opposition memorandum on January 
9, 2007. R.4184-4348. Defendants filed a reply memorandum on February 5, 2007. 
R.4356-4373. The district court held oral argument on the motion on April 5, 2007 and 
issued an Order on June 8, 2007 denying the motion. Add.l 1, R.4433-4436. 
19. On July 10, 2007 the district court entered a Judgment. Add. 12-13, R.4440-
4442. On August 6, 2007, Plaintiff Giusti filed his Notice of Appeal, Add.14, R.4443-
4444, and on August 20, 2007, SWC, Hyde and Erickson filed their Notice of 
Conditional Cross Appeal. R.4450-4453. 
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20. On August 24, 2007, the district court entered a Final Order, Add. 15, 
R.4456-4458, denying Defendants5 motion for attorney fees and granting them costs of 
$55.50. On September 7, 2007, SWC, Hyde and Erickson filed a Notice of Appeal from 
the Final Order dated August 24, 2007. R.4469-4471. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In February 1999, SunGard, a computer software and services company 
incorporated in Delaware, purchased SWC, a Utah corporation located in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, as a wholly owned subsidiary. Subsequently, SunGard changed SWC's name to 
SunGard Expert Solutions, Inc. ("SES"). SunGard officers including Bronstein, Gross 
and McDugall, became officers of SES. See, First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), ^ 6 , 
9,10, Add.16, R.55, 60-61; Giusti Aff., ^5, Add.17, R.269; R.335; Giusti Supp. Aff., [^19, 
Add.18, R.585; R.587; Articles of Amendment, R.3001; SunGard officers, R.336, R.3367 
and officers of SES, R.1004. SunGard business entities, including SWC, aka SES, have 
and/or continue to do business in Utah. R. 1006-1025. 
2. Upon its acquisition by SunGard, SWC became an "operating unit" in a 
Division of SunGard and SWC's revenue was owned by SunGard and reported in 
SunGard's income. See, Hyde Dep.45:l-46:8, R.947,959-960. SWC and its products and 
services were "re-branded" with SunGard designs and themes. See, Erickson 1/4/00 
email, R.95, under "Compensation," referring to SWC and other SunGard subsidiaries as 
"operating units" of SunGard and indicating that SunGard dictates SWC employee 
compensation; See also, Giusti Aff, ffi[17,38,57(D), 1J58(F-H), Add.17, R.274, 280, 
286,288-289; Letterhead describing SWC as "a SunGard Company", R.326; R.301-303; 
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facts under heading "X. Marketing Initiative", R.311; Erickson email, R.95-96; Erickson 
Dep.43:l-14,R.973,984. 
3. Following its acquisition of SWC and during Plaintiff Giusti's recruitment 
and employment at SWC, SunGard advertised and sold computer software and services 
to customers in the United States, including Utah, and some foreign countries, directly 
via interactive Internet sites and indirectly through its subsidiaries, including SWC. See, 
FAC, TJ9, Add. 16, R.60-61; Giusti Aff., ffl[6,16-17, 57-62, Add. 17, R.270, 274, 285-292; 
facts under heading "IX.", R.311; Giusti Supp. Aff., Ijl9, Add. 18 and Exh. 1 thereto, 
R.588-595; See also, Ps Mem., R.210-215. 
4. During the summer of 1999, SunGard President Christobal Conde and Vice 
President Robert Greifeld ("Greifeld") traveled to Utah to interview and select the 
President of SWC. They selected Hyde for the position and determined his compensation. 
Hyde's SWC stock was converted to SunGard stock options. See, Hyde Dep.35:17-38:23, 
R.947, 951-955. 
5. Between September 1 and November 7, 1999, SunGard and SWC, through 
Hyde (at that time, SWC's President) and Erickson (at that time, SWC's Vice President 
of Operations), recruited Plaintiff Giusti for the position of Vice President of Sales at 
SWC. See, FAC, [^16, Add. 16, R.62; Giusti Aff., p , Add. 17, R.269. 
6. During Giusti's recruitment, Hyde informed Giusti that SWC was a 
SunGard company, that SunGard had assumed control of SWC's operations and that 
SWC would be developing and selling new SunGard products in the United States, 
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including Utah. See, Giusti Aff, ffl[5-6, Add. 17, R.269-270; III(A)(1, 2) at 5-7, R.210-
212. 
7. During Giusti's recruitment, Hyde represented to Giusti that he had 
authority from SunGard to negotiate the terms of Giusti's employment subject to 
SunGard's approval. See, Giusti Aff., ffl[9, 58(B), Add. 17, R.270, 287; III (A)(l)(8) 
at5-6,R.210-211. 
8. During Giusti's recruitment, the employment benefits Hyde promised 
Giusti to induce his employment at SWC, including the bonuses, stock options, 401(k) 
retirement benefits and insurance benefits came from SunGard and SunGard's board of 
directors had to approve the 7,500 SunGard stock options offered to Plaintiff. See, Giusti 
Aff, 1157(C), R.285-286,1J58(B), Add. 17, R.287; November 7 Contract, Add.4, R.83-84; 
December 16 Contract, Add.5, R.91-92; III (A)(l)(10) at 5-6, R.210-211; Greifeld 
Dep.21:25-23:6, R.3536, 3538-3540. 
9. During Giusti's recruitment, Hyde told Giusti that he (Hyde) was to be 
promoted to a higher management position within SunGard and that Giusti's executive 
employment at SWC would put him in line for such promotions. Giusti told Hyde that this 
representation was highly material to his decision to accept employment at SWC. See, 
FAC, 1fl9(P), Add. 16, R.65; Giusti Aff, ffi[7-8, Add. 17, R.270; III(A)(3)(4)(h) at 8, 
R.212-213;HydeDep.34:10-35:16,R.947,950,951. 
10. At the time of his recruitment, Plaintiff Giusti was already employed as 
Senior Vice President of Marketing for Cambric Corporation in Salt Lake City, Utah. He 
had an annual base salary of $125,000, due to increase to $135,000 on January 1, 2000, 
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plus an $800 per month car allowance, paid vacation and medical and dental insurance. 
Plaintiff had also received the first $25,000 of a $100,000 performance bonus, the 
remainder of which was to be paid in equal installments during the first three quarters of 
2000. The second $25,000 bonus was based solely on easily achievable personal 
performance goals, while the remaining $50,000 depended on Cambric's overall 
performance. See, Giusti Aff., Tf1f4,l4, Add. 17, R.269, 274; R.3674; Cambric Offer 
Letter, R.3111; Giusti Dep.l01:17-102:23, R.2943, 2960-2961. 
11. Because Plaintiff Giusti was 41 years old and did not want to risk his 
family's economic security by changing jobs and leaving a secure salaried executive 
position at Cambric after only a few months of employment to take an executive position 
at SWC in which much of his income would depend on bonuses, commissions and 
overrides from client accounts that Giusti would need time to develop, Giusti and Hyde 
orally agreed that Giusti would be guaranteed a minimum of 12 months employment at 
SWC during which he would receive a non-recoverable monthly subsidy in addition to 
his regular monthly salary. See, Giusti note re 10/30/99 interview with Hyde, R.3473-
3474. This particular agreement was incorporated in the "offer letter" signed by Hyde 
offering Plaintiff Giusti employment at SWC and stated that 
The base salary for this position will be $90,000 ... SWC will also provide 
you with a monthly subsidy payment or non-recoverable draw for a 12 month 
period to allow you to build the staff in the product area and grow your 
personal book of business and start receiving overrides and commissions. 
For the first 12 months of employment SWC will provide you with a payment 
of $7,500per month. Your commission and overrides during the ramp up 
period will be applied to the subsidy payment. At anytime during the 12 
month period you can make a one time election to move from the subsidy 
plan to the commission and override plan if you desire. 
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The last paragraph of the "offer letter" provided that Giusti could accept the offer 
by signing and returning the letter by November 8, 1999. Plaintiff signed and returned the 
offer letter on November 7, 1999, thereby creating a binding contract between the parties 
referred to herein as the November 7 Contract. See, FAC, ffi|19(I-J), Add. 16, Giusti Aff., 
nflO(I-J), 19,21, Add. 17, R.272, 275-276; November 7 Contract, Add.4, R.83-84; Point 
II, R.568-574; ffi|B and C, R.3676, 3703; Giusti Dep.21:14-25:4, R.2943, 2944-2947. 
12. During their recruitment of Giusti, Hyde and Erickson never discussed at-
will employment and never informed Giusti that after starting work at SWC he would 
have to sign another agreement relinquishing his employment for a specified term. See, 
Giusti Aff., f 19,21, Add. 17, R.275-276; Erickson Dep.l54:9-21, R.3397, 3415; Hyde 
Dep.l42:24-143:9, R.3307,3308-3309; 217:24-218:3, R.3282, 3302-3303. 
13. On or about November 24, 1999, Greifeld promoted Hyde to the position of 
CEO of the Customer Relationship Management Group (CRM) of SunGard and 
determined Hyde's salary in that position. See, Greifeld Memo to "All Division 
Employees", R.301-302; Giusti Aff., [^17, Add. 17, R. 274; R.3163; R.3515; Hyde 
Dep.32:l 1-25, R.3282, 3283; Hyde Dep.34:14-35:16, R.947,950-951. 
14. In November and December 1999, Hyde negotiated with Greifeld that 
SWC would provide revenue of $22.5M to SunGard in the year 2000. Hyde 
subsequently tried to negotiate a lower amount but Greifeld refused and Hyde was 
directly accountable to Greifeld to produce this revenue for SunGard. See, Hyde 
Dep.l74:19-181:4, R.3282, 3294-3301; Greifeld Dep.47:ll- 48:5, R.3536,3541-3542. 
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15. In recruiting Plaintiff Giusti, Hyde and Erickson made numerous fraudulent 
representations, some of which were included in the parties' November 7 Contract, to 
induce Plaintiff Giusti to leave his secure executive employment at Cambric and become 
employed at SWC, including materially false and misleading representations that: (1) 
Plaintiff had a guaranteed minimum of 12 months employment at SWC; (2) SWC had a 
strong and effective management team; (3) SWC had a strong and effective Sales 
organization that Plaintiff would be managing; (4) SWC had ample revenue from an 
established client base sufficient to produce the annual income of $300,000 to $350,000, 
including the bonuses and commissions Hyde promised Plaintiff Giusti he would earn at 
SWC; and that (5) Giusti's successful performance as Vice President of Sales at SWC 
would provide him with opportunities for advancement to higher management positions 
within SunGard. See, FAC, t i l9-21, Add.16, R.62-65; Giusti Aff, 1110-13, Add. 17, 
R.270-273; November 7 Contract, Add.4, R.83-85. 
16. In reliance on the foregoing fraudulent representations and omissions of 
Hyde and Erickson, Plaintiff Giusti left his secure executive position at Cambric to 
become employed as the Vice President of Sales at SWC under the terms of the oral 
agreements and November 7 Contract he had negotiated with Hyde. Giusti began 
working at SWC on December 1, 1999 and thereafter faithfully performed the duties of 
his employment. See, FAC, 1122,23, Add.16, R.65-66; Giusti Aff., 1112,18,37, Add.17, 
R.273-274, 280; 16(A), R.3675, Point 1(A), R.3700-3701; Answer, 123, R.726. 
17. A few days after beginning his employment at SWC, Pat Black ("Black"), 
the Human Resources Director at SWC, left a packet of forms with Plaintiff Giusti she 
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said employees were required to sign in order to receive employment benefits. On 
December 6, 1999, Black returned for the documents, which included a form titled 
Sterling Wentworth Employment Agreement ("SWC Agreement"). See, Giusti Supp. 
Aff., ffi[3-5, Add. 18, R.582; Giusti Dep.43:3-47:16, R.2943, 2949-2953; Point III, R.574-
576; f7(A-E), R.3675-3677; 91:2-93:9, R.3142, 3148-3150. 
18. Plaintiff Giusti had expected to sign a confidentiality and non-compete 
agreement that were standard in the high tech industry and noted these provisions in the 
SWC Agreement. However, the SWC Agreement also contained provisions stating that 
employment could be terminated at any time "with or without cause." Giusti informed 
Black that these provisions did not apply to his employment at SWC because he had 
negotiated a different arrangement under his oral and written employment agreements 
with Hyde. Black stated that she had no knowledge of Giusti5s agreements with Hyde and 
that Giusti had to sign the documents to receive his employment benefits. See, Giusti 
Supp. Aff, Add. 18, R.582; Giusti Dep.43:3-47:16, R.2943,2949-2953; 1J7(A-E), R.3675-
3677; Point I (B)(2), R.3704-3706; Black Dep.94:3-95:4, R.3143,3151-3152; 
19. Based on Black's representation that Plaintiff Giusti was required to sign 
the document in order to receive employment benefits at SWC and because ^7.3 of the 
SWC Agreement allowed Giusti to rely on SWC's prior representation of a minimum 12 
months employment at SWC as contemplated in the parties' oral agreement and 
November 7 Contract, Plaintiff Giusti signed the SWC Agreement on December 6, 1999, 
although it is dated a day earlier. Plaintiff did not receive any separate consideration for 
signing the SWC Agreement. Subsequently, Plaintiff Giusti learned that Black's 
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representation that Giusti was required to sign the Agreement in order to obtain his 
employment benefits was fraudulent and that no such requirement existed. See, Giusti 
Supp. Aff, HH3.10, Add. 18, R.582-583; November 7 Contract, Add. 4, R.83-85; §7.3, 
SWC Agreement, Add. 6, R.423-427; Hf7(A-E), 8(A), R.3675-3677; Giusti Dep.43:3-
47:16, 439:5-18, R.2943, 2949-2953, 2987; SunGardPlan Provisions, R.3361-3365. 
20. SunGard officials, including Greifeld and CFO Susan Vadner ("Vadner"), 
exercised a high degree of control over SWC's operations, including decisions regarding 
the revenue to be generated by SWC and SWC personnel matters encompassing the 
hiring, compensation, promotion and termination of SWC employees, including the 
termination of Plaintiff Giusti's employment, through constant oral and written 
communications via telephone, fax, email and letters with Hyde and Erickson. Hyde 
reported directly to Greifeld. See, FAC1J9, Add. 16, R. 60-61; Giusti Aff., U57(A)-(G), 
1J58(A)-(H), Add. 17, R.285-289, Exh.2, R.301-302; SunGard control over SWC 
operations, R.329; Point III, R.210-215; Erickson 1/4/00 email, FAC, Add. 16, R.95-96; 
Vadner email, R.329; SWC Report to SunGard, R.308-311; 118(C), R.3681; Greifeld 
Dep.47:21-48:5, R.3536,3541-3542; SunGard Acquisition Strategy from SunGard 
website, R.333-335. See also, Email dated 5/16/00, R.935. 
21. Within the first two weeks of his employment at SWC, Plaintiff Giusti 
observed that contrary to the representations made by Hyde and Erickson to induce his 
employment, SWC did not have a strong management and sales team or a reliable 
revenue stream or client base and that the corporation was, in fact, in a state of financial 
and organizational chaos. He also discovered that many employees, including those in the 
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Sales organization, had quit or were in the process of doing so based on their frustration 
with the mismanagement of the SWC Sales organization by Hyde and Chad Gardner, the 
former Vice President of Sales at SWC. See, FAC, ffi[23-31, Add. 16, R.66-68; Giusti 
Aff., 1flJ23-31, Add. 17, R.276-278; R. 306; R.3312,3513. 
22. When Giusti confronted Hyde with the discrepancies between the 
representations made to induce his employment at SWC and the apparent condition of 
SWC, its management, Sales organization and client revenue base, Hyde made further 
fraudulent representations to Plaintiff Giusti that he would receive all of the 
compensation and benefits previously promised, as well as additional compensation, 
organizational support and ample time to recruit, rebuild and train the SWC Sales 
organization, and then to begin to manage and grow the prestige personal accounts Hyde 
had promised Giusti. Hyde also fraudulently represented to Plaintiff Giusti that he would 
increase Giusti's sales override such that Giusti would receive " 1 % of corporate revenue" 
rather than just the " 1 % override of revenue produced by the sales people you manage," 
Giusti received under the parties' prior November 7 Contract. This representation was 
contained in an offer letter Plaintiff Giusti signed on December 16, 1999, hereinafter 
referred to as the "December 16 Contract", Add.5, R.88-95. See, FAC, 1^31-32, Add. 16, 
R.68; Giusti Aff, 1J32-33, Add. 17, R.278-279; Giusti Notes of 12-10-99 Meeting with 
Hyde, R.3479-3484; 12/8/99 Hyde email to Giusti, R.3518; 1[18(B), R.3680-3681. 
23. In the cover email to the December 16 Contract, Hyde represents to Giusti 
that, "If I do my math correct, you should have no problem getting to the $300k plus 
range in personal compensation if we hit our financial targets." See, Hyde email, R.87. 
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This representation was fraudulent because Hyde knew at the time he made the 
representation that SWC was in such deep financial trouble and had lost so many 
employees that it was impossible for SWC to meet the financial target Hyde had 
promised Greifeld for the year 2000. See, FAC, Tf32, Add. 16, R.68; December 16 
Contract, Add.5, R.87-93; Giusti Aff, 134-35, Add. 17, R.279; 12/6/99 Hyde memo, 
R.306; Emails dated 10/8/99 and 11/9/99, R.3312,3513; Email dated 1/4/00, FAC, 
Add. 16, R.95-96; Erickson 1/11/00 email, R.3367-3368. 
24. In reliance on Hyde's continued fraudulent representations, Plaintiff Giusti 
worked diligently to recruit and train a new SWC Sales organization, after which he 
planned to develop the personal prestige accounts promised to him by Hyde. See, FAC, 
133, Add. 16, R.68-69; Giusti Aff., ^36-37, Add. 17, R.279-280; Hyde Email and 
December 16 Contract, Add.5, R.87, 91-93. 
25. On January 4, 2000, Erickson, now the new SWC President and Giusti's 
supervisor, sent a memo designated "highly important and confidential" to Greifeld 
(copied to Hyde) reminding them that in July, 1999, Erickson had informed Greifeld that 
SWC and its Sales organization were falling apart, that SWC employees were leaving in 
droves, and that SWC's chances of making projected revenues for SunGard during the 
year 2000 were virtually non-existent unless Hyde and Gardner, the former Vice 
President of Sales, produced the revenue. Erickson noted this was unlikely because 
Greifeld had assigned Hyde as SunGard group CEO and had assigned Gardner to drive 
new acquisitions. See, FAC, ffi[34-37, Add. 16, R.69-70, 95-96; Giusti Aff., ffl|38-40, 
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Add. 17, R.280-281; Emails dated 10/8/99 and 11/9/99, R.3312,3513; Erickson 
Dep.89:10-96:25, R.3370,3379-3386; 97:1-11, R.973, 992. 
26. In the same memo, Erickson informed Greifeld that although they have a 
new VP in the sales area [Plaintiff Giusti], that he "will need six to nine months to have 
the right sales people hired, trained, engaged and finalizing contract negotiations before 
revenue will flow." (Emphasis supplied) See, citations to 1J25. 
27. From January through March, 2000, Hyde and Erickson repeatedly 
represented to Plaintiff Giusti that senior SunGard officials, including Greifeld, were 
fully aware that the year 2000 would be a "rebuilding period" at SWC and that the 
revenue Hyde had promised Greifeld that SWC would contribute to SunGard in 2000 
would not be provided by the new Sales organization. See, FAC, 1J38, Add. 16, R.70-71; 
Giusti Aff., lJ29,41-43; Add.17, R.277, 281-282; Hyde 11/9/99 email, R.3513; Email to 
Giusti dated 1/6/00 forwarding Erickson's 1/4/00 email to Greifeld, FAC, Add. 16, R.95-
96; Giusti Notes of 12/10/99 meeting with Hyde, para.5, R.3479; 111118(A), R.3680; 
CracroftDep.53:20-54:14,R.3317, 3332-3333; R.3509. 
28. During the spring of 2000, Plaintiff Giusti worked diligently and effectively 
to recruit and train a new sales organization for SWC and both Hyde and Erickson 
acknowledged Giusti's success in doing so. See, Hyde 4/6/00 email, para.l, R.3520; 
FAC, 1fH33, 41-42, Add. 16, R.68-69,71; Giusti Aff., H1J44,45, Add.17, R.282; ffi[18(D), 
20(C), R.3682, 3685-3686; R.3173-3174; Cracroft Dep.l2:15-13:2415:2-; 16:2-17:1; 
49:1-52:5,53:16-54:24; 59:15-18, 73:16-22, R.3317, 3318-3322, 3328-3333,3335-3336; 
Hyde 4/6/00 email, para.l, R.3520. 
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29. In March 2000 Plaintiff Giusti encountered difficulty in training the new 
SWC sales team because Hyde and Erickson had no adequate training materials and 
Plaintiff Giusti had to develop these materials. See, FAC, Add. 16, 1J39, R.71; Giusti Aff., 
Add. 17, 1ffl42-43, R.281-282; Stuart Dep.37:16-40:5, 44:7-45:11, R.3177,3184-3189. 
Also, Hyde regularly circumvented and undermined Giusti's management of the SWC 
Sales organization by communicating with employees under Giusti's supervision without 
notifying Giusti. See, FAC, 1)40, Add. 16, R.71; Meyers Dep.70:5-20, R.3201, 3204. 
30. In March 2000 Hyde could not produce the revenue from SWC he had 
previously committed to SunGard. To save his own job, Hyde began a malicious 
campaign to shift responsibility for Hyde's own failure to meet this commitment onto 
Plaintiff Giusti and Erickson joined this campaign to save his job. Hyde and Erickson 
engaged in this conduct despite their prior recognition that the new sales team recruited 
by Plaintiff Giusti would need six to nine months before they started producing 
significant revenue, and that until that time, Hyde had committed to "carry the 
responsibility for hitting our sales system numbers." See, Hyde 10/8/99 email, R.3312; 
H18(C), R.3681; Hyde 12/14/99 email, R.3509; Hyde 3/1/00 email, R.3515-3516; Hyde 
4/6/00 and 4/20/00 emails, R.3520, 3531; Hyde 4/25/00 email, R.3193; Giusti Dep. 
310:12-25, 313:2-7, R. 2969, 2973-2974. 
31. On April 3, 2000, Plaintiff Giusti observed Hyde meeting with Randy 
Moore, President of Frontier Analytics, a California corporation, at SWC's offices in Salt 
Lake City. Hyde told Giusti that he was negotiating with Moore on behalf of SunGard to 
purchase Frontier. Subsequently, on June 19, 2000, SunGard issued a press release 
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through SWC's office in Salt Lake City, Utah, announcing SunGard's acquisition of 
Frontier Analytics. See, Point III (A)(2), R.211-212; Giusti Aff, Add.17,H59(D,F), 
R.290-291; Press Release, R.339; Hyde Dep.43:21-46:8, R.947, 957-960. 
32. In his role as Vice President of Sales, Plaintiff Giusti also learned that 
SunGard officials were developing a new product known as the SunGard PowerStation 
with officials of SWC and the two other SunGard companies under Hyde's management, 
EMS and Plaid Brothers. On April 26, 2000, Plaintiff attended a meeting with SunGard 
executives in Utah to discuss customer prospects for this new SunGard product, which 
was to be marketed in all states, including Utah. See, Giusti Aff, ^|59(C), Add.17, R.290; 
SunGard eCRM web page, R.590. 
33. On or about April 26, 2000, Plaintiff Giusti consulted with SWC financial 
personnel concerning potential incoming revenue from the new SWC Sales organization, 
indicating that he might exercise his one time election to move from the monthly subsidy 
plan to the commission and override plan whereby he would receive a 1% override on all 
corporate sales promised to him under the parties' December 16, 1999 Contract, Add.5, 
R.91-93. See, Giusti Aff., [^46, Add.17, R.282. 
34. Within a few days of this consultation and only five months after Plaintiff 
Giusti began working at SWC, Hyde and Erickson threatened to terminate Giusti's 
employment "for cause" based on false and malicious allegations that Giusti, not Hyde, 
was responsible for producing SWC's revenue contribution to SunGard for the year 2000 
and that he had failed to meet this responsibility. See, FAC, ^[43, Add. 16, R.72; Giusti 
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Aff., 1)47, Add.17, R.282; 1J20(A), R.3685, Emails, R.3193,3210,3168-3169 ; Giusti 
Dep.684:l-5,R.3034,3035. 
35. Hyde and Erickson made these materially false and malicious allegations 
and threats to terminate Plaintiff Giusti's employment "for cause" for the improper 
purpose of saving their own jobs by the improper means of deceitfully shifting the blame 
for SWC's failure to meet SunGard's 2000 revenue demands from themselves to Giusti, 
to avoid having to pay Giusti the commissions and overrides Hyde had offered Giusti to 
induce his initial and continuing employment at SWC, and not for any legitimate business 
purpose of SunGard or SWC. Hyde and Erickson refused to provide Giusti with any 
information regarding their allegations or to discuss the factual basis for the charges, 
knowing that they were false and malicious. See, FAC, ]fl|44-45, Add. 16, R.72; Giusti 
Aff., 1ffl48,50 Add.17, R.283; Giusti Dep.l073:25-1074:23, 1076:2-17, R.3060,3062-
3064; Giusti Notes of 5/8/00 Conversation with Erickson, R.3198. 
36. At the time Hyde and Erickson threatened to terminate Plaintiff Giusti's 
employment "for cause" based on their false and malicious charges, they knew that their 
termination of Giusti's employment would severely damage Plaintiff Giusti's 
professional business reputation, cause Plaintiff Giusti emotional distress and interfere 
with Giusti's future prospects for executive employment with SunGard and other 
employers. See, FAC, ffl[46, Add. 16, R.73; Giusti Aff., ^55, Add.17, R.284. 
37. Hyde maligned Plaintiff Giusti's performance to SunGard officials, 
including Greifeld and informed Greifeld that he was terminating Giusti's employment. 
See, Greifeld Dep.64:6-65:18, R.3536, 3544-3545, Email 5/16/00, R.3314-3315. 
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38. When Plaintiff Giusti challenged Hyde's and Erickson's threats to 
terminate his employment "for cause" based on their false and malicious charges of 
unsatisfactory performance, Erickson informed Giusti that SunGard officials, including 
SunGard's attorney, Larry Gross, had reviewed and approved the basis for terminating 
Giusti's employment. See, Giusti's Notes of Conversation With Erickson on 5/9/00; 
R.3427-3428; Hyde Dep.93:l-12, R.3282,3289. 
39. On May 12, 2000, Erickson sent Giusti a letter purporting to terminate 
Giusti's employment "without cause" after having just informed plaintiff Giusti that his 
employment was being terminated "for cause." See, FAC, TfTf45-49 and Exh. 4 thereto, 
Add. 16, R.72-74, 98; Giusti Aff., ffi[52-56, Add. 17, R.283-285. 
40. On or before May 16, 2000, Hyde sent an email to Greifeld, copied to 
several other SunGard officials, stating that he had terminated Giusti's employment and 
asking Greifeld if he had any "good" sales managers, implying that Giusti had not been a 
"good" sales manager. Greifeld responded on May 16, 2000 complimenting Hyde on the 
closure of two large sales. See, Hyde's email to Greifeld and response, R.3314-3315. 
41. Greifeld testified that anyone who had been terminated from a SunGard 
company would have had little chance of being rehired by SunGard or any SunGard 
company and that he personally couldn't think of anyone who had been fired from a 
SunGard company that had been rehired. See, Greifeld Dep.72:3-23, R.3536,3547. 
42. As the result of being fraudulently induced to leave his employment at 
Cambric and to accept employment and employment contracts at S WC, Plaintiff Giusti 
incurred damages including: (1) the loss of $135,000 in annual base salary Plaintiff 
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would have received at Cambric starting January 2000 {See, Cambric Offer Letter, 
R.3113, Giusti Dep. 101:18-24, R.2943,2960, November 7 Contract, Add.4); (2) the loss 
of an $800 per month car allowance Plaintiff received at Cambric but did not receive at 
SWC (See, Cambric Offer Letter, R.3111; Giusti Dep.l01:18-103:3, R.2943, 2960-2962; 
1J9(B), R.3678); (3) the loss of a $25,000 bonus Plaintiff would have received at Cambric 
based on easily attainable personal performance goals (See, T|4(A), ^J9(B), R. 3674,3678; 
Giusti Dep.l09:4-21, R.2943,2964, Hays Dep.37:20-22, R.3420,3421; 90 Day 
Evaluation, R.3280); and (4) the loss of his secure executive employment at Cambric. 
(See, FAC, ffl[16-22, Add. 16, R.62-66; Giusti Aff, ffi[4-12, Add. 17, R.269-273; ^|6(A), 
R.3675) 
43. Plaintiff Giusti also incurred "benefit of the bargain" damages representing 
the income and benefits he would have received during his employment at SWC until his 
retirement had Hyde's and Erickson's fraudulent representations been true, including: (5) 
the loss of $30,000-$35,000 SunGard EIC annual bonus (See, December 16 Contract, 
Add. 5, R.92; FAC, 1fl[l9(K), 67> Add. 16, R.64, 79; Giusti Aff, ^IO(K), Add. 17, R.272); 
(6) the loss of 7,500 shares of SunGard stock options on a five year vesting program and 
the income from such shares (See, December 16 Contract, Add.5, R.92; FAC, ^19(L), 
67, Add. 16, R.64,72; Giusti Aff., 1J10(L), Add. 17, R.272; 1J9(A), R.3677-3678); (7) the 
loss of six and one half months of the non-recoverable $7,500 per month subsidy 
guaranteed to Plaintiff in addition to his salary at SWC during his first 12 months of 
employment (See, December 16 Contract, Add. 5, R.92; FAC, ffi[19(U), 67, Add. 16, 
R.64,79; Giusti Aff., ^|10(I, J), Add. 17, R.272; 1J9(A), R.3677-3678); (8) the loss of 
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salary, additional bonuses, salary increases, stock options, commissions, overrides on 
SWC corporate sales, benefits and vacations Plaintiff Giusti would have reasonably 
received (See, FAC, 167, Add. 16, R.79; December 16 Contract, Add.5, R.91-92; f9(A), 
R.3677-3678, Expert Report, R.3473-3762); (9) the loss of the license and service 
commissions on the prestige accounts including the State Farm, Prudential and Equitable/ 
AXA accounts assigned to Plaintiff Giusti (See, FAC, 167, Add. 16, R.79; December 16 
Contract, Add.5, R.91; Giusti Aff., 11OC, Add. 17, R. 271; 19(A), R.3677-3678; Giusti 
Dep. 317:8-318:9, R.2969,2976-2977, Expert Report, R.3473-3762); (10) the opportunity 
for advancement to higher level positions in SunGard (See, FAC, 119(P), Add. 16, R.65; 
Giusti Aff, 117-8, Add. 17, R. 270; 19(B), R.3678; Giusti Dep.632:21-633:24, 
R.2989,3007-3008; 657:19-658:14, R. 2989,3025-3026, 920:21-921:9, R.3046,3050-
3051; Greifeld Dep.72:3-23, R.3536, 3547); (11) the loss of his executive position at 
SWC and SunGard (See, FAC, 167 and Exh.4, Add. 16, R.79, 98); (12) damage to 
Plaintiffs professional reputation and earning capacity (See, FAC, 167, Add. 16, R.79; 
Giusti Dep.657:19-658:14, R. 2989,3025-3026, 660:16-662:3, R.2989, 3028-3030; 
Greifeld Dep.72:3-23, R.3536,3547); (13) emotional distress damages (See, FAC H46, 
65, 67-68, Add. 16, R.73,78-80; Giusti Aff, 155, Add.17, R.284; Myers Dep.67:10-19; 
69:10-23; R.3201,3202-3203); and (14) the expenses incurred to mitigate damages and 
redress the fraud. (See, FAC, 168, Add. 16, R.80). See also, generally, R.3884-3905. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I The district court erred in dismissing SunGard for lack of personal 
jurisdiction and in denying Plaintiff Giusti's requests for discovery on the issue, where the 
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court considered matters outside the pleadings, failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
and improperly weighed and resolved the parties' conflicting evidence against Giusti. The 
district court also erred by requiring more than the "light" prima facie showing of general 
or specific personal jurisdiction sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. 
POINT II The district court erred in granting summary judgment against 
Plaintiff Giusti on his contract claims in Counts II-IV and in limiting his fraudulent 
inducement claim in Count I and the damages recoverable thereon, based on its incorrect 
conclusion that the SWC Agreement precluded or limited such claims, where (1) the 
SWC Agreement allows Giusti to rely on SWC's prior representation of a minimum of 12 
months employment contained in the parties' prior November 7 Contract; (2) Giusti did 
not consent to the modification of the specified term of employment in the November 7 
Contract by signing the SWC Agreement; (3) Giusti claimed that the SWC Agreement 
was fraudulently induced, and (4) genuinely disputed issues of material fact remain for 
trial on these claims such that Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
POINT III The district court erred in granting summary judgment against 
Plaintiff Giusti on his claim in Count I against Defendants for fraudulently inducing him 
to leave his secure executive employment at Cambric and to accept employment and 
employment contracts at SWC, based on the district court's incorrect conclusion that 
Giusti failed to demonstrate any damages resulting from this fraud. The district court 
made this incorrect ruling based on its prior incorrect conclusion, discussed in Point II, 
that the SWC Agreement precluded Plaintiff from recovering "benefit of the bargain" 
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damages incurred after the termination of his employment as the result of the fraudulent 
inducement of his employment and employment contracts at SWC. 
Based on the foregoing incorrect conclusions, the district court further erred by 
discounting Plaintiff Giusti's substantial evidence of the consequential financial, 
reputational and emotional damages he incurred as the result of being fraudulently 
induced to accept employment and employment contracts at SWC. The district court also 
erred in concluding that Plaintiff Giusti was not claiming damages for income earned as 
of the termination of his employment that had not been paid, and in failing to consider 
Plaintiffs evidence regarding the loss of overrides and commissions. The district court 
further erred by failing to consider, or by considering and improperly resolving, the 
parties' conflicting evidence regarding the damages Giusti incurred as the result of being 
fraudulently induced to leave his prior employment at Cambric against Plaintiff Giusti. 
Finally, the district court erred in placing the burden of proving the affirmative defense of 
mitigation of damages on Plaintiff Giusti rather than on the Defendants. Based on all of 
the foregoing errors, the district court incorrectly concluded that Plaintiff Giusti failed to 
make a prima facie showing of damages on his claim of fraudulent inducement in Count I 
and incorrectly granted summary judgment against Plaintiff Giusti on this claim. 
POINT IV The district court erred in granting summary judgment against Plaintiff 
Giusti on his claim in Count V against Hyde and Erickson for their tortious interference 
with his existing and prospective economic relations with SWC and SunGard and other 
prospective employers, based on the court's incorrect conclusion that reasonable minds 
could not differ on the issue of whether Hyde and Erickson were motivated by the purely 
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personal reason of trying to save their own jobs in making false and malicious charges 
against Plaintiff Giusti, in using these charges to malign Giusti to SunGard officials and 
to justify the termination of Giusti's employment and in terminating Giusti's 
employment. 
ARGUMENT 
I THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING SUNGARD FOR 
LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND IN FAILING TO 
ALLOW PLAINTIFF DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUE 
The district court erred in granting SunGard's motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction and in denying Plaintiff Giusti's request for specific discovery on 
the issue where (1) the pertinent facts bearing on personal jurisdiction were directly 
disputed, (2) the court considered matters outside the pleadings, (3) the court improperly 
weighed and resolved the parties' conflicting evidence against Plaintiff Giusti, and (4) the 
court required more than a prima facie showing of general or specific jurisdiction. See, 
Order dated January 2, 2001, Add.2; Course of Proceedings, *[flf2, 4-6, 8, 10, supra at 5-7. 
Where, as in the instant case, the district court does not hold an evidentiary hearing 
or permit discovery, the plaintiff may defeat a motion to dismiss asserting lack of 
personal jurisdiction by making a prima facie showing of general or specific personal 
jurisdiction. Fenn v. Mleads Enterprises, Inc., 2006 UT 8, ^|8, 137 P.3d 706; Anderson v. 
American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 
1990). This showing may be made by affidavit or other written materials demonstrating 
facts that if true, support personal jurisdiction over the defendant. OMI Holdings, Inc. v. 
Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 1998). "Although plaintiff 
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bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction, .. .in the preliminary stages of 
litigation, this burden is 'light.'" Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Internet Solutions, Inc., 205 F.3d 
1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000). Any disputes in the documentary evidence are resolved in 
the plaintiffs favor and the district court may not weigh the evidence. Anderson, at 827; 
Neways, Inc. v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 422 (Utah 1997). A district court abuses its 
discretion in denying discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction when the denial 
results in prejudice to the plaintiff. Such prejudice occurs "where pertinent facts bearing 
on the question of jurisdiction are controverted.. .or where a more satisfactory showing of 
the facts is necessary." THAgr. & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Group Ltd., 416 
F.Supp.2d 1054, 1073-1074 (internal citations omitted) 
In the instant case, Plaintiff Giusti asserts that the district court has both general 
and specific jurisdiction over SunGard. 
A. General Personal Jurisdiction 
General personal jurisdiction permits a court to exercise power over a defendant 
without regard to the subject matter of the claim asserted. For such jurisdiction to exist, 
the defendant must be conducting substantial and continuous activity in the forum state 
and each case must be factually examined as it arises. Under the Utah Long Arm Statute, 
§78-27-24, Add.l at 3, conduct furnishing personal jurisdiction over a defendant includes: 
(1) transacting any business within this state;1 (2) contracting to supply services or goods 
in this state; (3) causing of any injury in this state whether tortious or by breach of 
1
 Section 78-27-23(2) defines the '"transaction of business within this state' as c[t]he 
activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state which affect 
persons or businesses within the State of Utah.'" (Emphasis supplied) See, Add.l at 2. 
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warranty; and (4) owning, using or possessing any property in this state. Ho v. Jim's 
Enterprises, 2001 UT 63, ffl[7-8, 29 P.3d 633, citing §78-27-24. In Ho, the Court provides 
a comprehensive, although not exhaustive, list of factors to be applied in determining 
whether a non-resident corporation is doing business in Utah. Id. 
The Utah legislature has declared that Utah Long Arm Statute must be interpreted 
to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, and that the non-resident defendant must have had 
minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See, Pro Axess, Inc. v. Orlux 
Distribution, Inc., 428 F.3d 1270, 1282 (10th Cir. 2005), citing §78-27-22; See also, 
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110-1111 (Utah 1985). 
"Companies conducting business through their subsidiaries can qualify as 
transacting business in a state, provided the parent exercises sufficient control over the 
subsidiary... A wholly owned subsidiary may be an agent and when its activities as an 
agent are of such a character as to amount to doing the business of the parent, the parent 
is subjected to the in personam jurisdiction of the state in which the activities occurred." 
ProAxess, at 1278, citing Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Cassel, 302 F.2d 132, 137 (10th Cir. 1962) 
and Phone Directories Co. v. Contel Corp., 786 F. Supp. 930, 943 (D.Utah 1992) (noting 
that a parent company's exertion of "significant influence" on a subsidiary suffices for a 
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the parent.) 
To establish general personal jurisdiction over SunGard, Plaintiff Giusti presented 
verified allegations from his First Amended Complaint, his sworn affidavit and 
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documentary evidence controverting the Bronstein affidavit supporting the motion to 
dismiss on each point, and demonstrating that SunGard directly engaged in substantial 
and continuous business activities in Utah, through its national and local officers and 
employees, including Conde, Greifeld, Vadner, Gross, Hyde and Erickson, by (1) 
transacting business in Utah; (2) contracting to supply services or goods in Utah; (3) 
causing tortious injury and damages to Plaintiff Giusti in Utah, and by (4) owning, using 
or possessing property in Utah. See, Subpoints 1- 4, R.210-215, citing allegations of 
Verified First Amended Complaint, Add. 16, R.58-98, and facts and documentary 
evidence in Giusti's Affidavit, Add. 17, R.268-339; Bronstein Affidavit, Add.20. 
B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction 
Specific personal jurisdiction arises from a non-resident defendant's contacts with 
the forum state related to the cause of action. To make a prima facie showing of specific 
personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that his claim arises out of one of the 
activities listed in the Long Arm statute and that the defendant has minimum contacts 
with the forum sufficient to satisfy the due process clause if the court exercises 
jurisdiction. See, Fenn v. Mleads Enterprises, Inc., 2006 UT 8, ^|8, 137 P.3d 706; Phone 
Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, ^|12, 8 P.3d 256; Anderson, 807 P.2d 
825, 827-828 (Utah 1990). 
To establish specific personal jurisdiction over SunGard, Plaintiff Giusti presented 
record evidence controverting the Bronstein affidavit supporting SunGard's motion, and 
showing that his claims for fraudulent inducement, breach of contract and promissory 
estoppel in Counts I-IV, arose out of SunGard's activities in Utah including: (1) 
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recruiting of employees in Utah, including Plaintiff Giusti, by Hyde and Erickson; (2) the 
negotiation, offer and acceptance of Giusti 5s oral and written employment contracts with 
SWC in Utah by SunGard officials Greifeld, Hyde and Erickson; (2) the fraudulent 
representations made by Hyde and Erickson to induce Giusti's employment and 
employment contracts in Utah by Hyde and Erickson; (3) the breaches of Giusti's 
employment contracts in Utah by Hyde and Erickson; (4) the breaches of the covenant of 
good faith inhering in Giusti's employment contracts in Utah by Greifeld, Hyde and 
Erickson; (5) the involvement of SunGard officials, including Gross, Greifeld, Hyde and 
Erickson in approving the wrongful termination of Giusti's employment in Utah; (6) 
causing tortious injury resulting in economic, reputation and emotional damages to 
Plaintiff Giusti in Utah. See, Subpoint 1(8)(9), R.210-211, Subpoint 3, R.212-215 (citing 
allegations of Verified First Amended Complaint, Add. 16, R.58-98) and facts and 
documentary evidence contained in Giusti Affidavit, Add. 17, R.268-339. 
Based on its extensive and ongoing contacts with the state of Utah and its direct 
involvement in the tortious injury and damages to Plaintiff Giusti in Utah, SunGard's 
right to due process is not offended by being haled into a Utah court to defend its actions 
in this case. See, ProAxess, at 1278-1279. By engaging in such contacts, SunGard sought 
the protection of the laws of Utah and submitted itself to this jurisdiction. Mallory Eng'g. 
Inc. v. TedR. Brown & Assoc, Inc., 618 P.2d 1004, 1007-1008 (Utah 1980). 
Additionally, Utah has an important interest in providing a forum in which their 
residents can seek redress for tortious injuries caused by out-of-state actors. The advent 
of modern communications and transportation, plus the fact that SunGard is a large, 
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interstate and multinational corporation with a base of operations in Utah shows that on 
balance, no unreasonable burden is placed on SunGard by litigating this action in Utah. 
See, ProAxess, at 1279-1281; Phone Directories v. Contel Corp, at 943-944. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should reverse the district court's order 
dismissing SunGard and remand this case with instructions to permit Plaintiff Giusti 
discovery to prove general and/or specific jurisdiction over SunGard at trial. 
II THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT CLAIMS AGAINST SWC 
A. The SWC Agreement Allowed Plaintiff Giusti To Rely On His Specified 
Term Of Employment Provided In The Parties' November 7 Contract 
The district court erred in granting SWC's motion for summary judgment on 
Plaintiff Giusti's contract claims in Counts II-IV. This ruling proceeded on the district 
court's conclusion that "Because the contract between the parties [referring to the SWC 
Agreement, Add. 6] explicitly provides for the termination of employment with or 
without cause, Plaintiffs causes of action on the Contract based upon such termination 
must fail." See, Order dated March 30, 2002 at 2-3, Add.3.3 This conclusion is incorrect. 
2
 Although Defendants filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), they argued that 
the motions should be treated as summary judgment motions. Accordingly, the district 
court allowed Plaintiff Giusti to file an affidavit and other evidentiary materials, 
including the damage report prepared by Plaintiffs expert, which the district court 
considered and did not exclude. See, Course of Proceedings, supra 1fij3-7, at 5-7. See, 
Doit, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 839 (Utah 1996) (Motion to dismiss 
treated as motion for summary judgment where evidentiary materials outside pleadings 
are admitted by the district court and not excluded.) 
3
 Plaintiff Giusti initially asserted the contract claims in Counts II-IV against Hyde and 
Erickson as well as SWC. However, Plaintiff does not appeal the dismissal of these 
claims against Hyde and Erickson based on their failure to contest they were acting as 
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The SWC Agreement, on its face, specifically allows Plaintiff Giusti to rely on 
SWC's prior representation of a minimum term of 12 months employment at SWC, which 
Giusti testified the parties orally agreed upon and incorporated in their November 7 
Contract. Section 7.3 of the SWC Agreement provides that: 
7.3 Miscellaneous. This Agreement constitutes the entire understanding 
and agreement between the Parties and supersedes all prior agreements, 
representations and understanding of the Parties. This Agreement may not 
be amended or modified except by an instrument in writing signed by each 
of the Parties. Each party acknowledges and agrees that he is not relying 
upon any representations, warranties or other statements concerning the 
subject matter of this Agreement except as may be expressly set forth in 
this agreement or related documents. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Plaintiff Giusti testified that he specifically informed SWC's HR Director, Pat 
Black, prior to signing the SWC Agreement, that the provisions in the SWC Agreement 
permitting termination of employment at any time, with or without cause, did not apply to 
his employment at SWC because he and Hyde and negotiated a different arrangement, 
thus manifesting his intent to rely on SWC's representation and agreement to provide him 
a guaranteed minimum of 12 months employment at SWC in the parties' prior November 
7 Contract. See, 1flf 11-12, 17-19, Statement of Facts, supra, at 13-14,15-17. Because §7.3 
of the SWC Agreement allows Plaintiff Giusti to rely on representations expressly set 
forth in "related documents", the district court's conclusion that the SWC Agreement 
bars Giusti's contract claims in Counts II through IV is incorrect and must be reversed. 
agents for disclosed principals SWC and SunGard, as alleged in Plaintiffs Verified First 
Amended Complaint. See, R. 131-133. 
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B. Plaintiff Giusti Did Not Agree To Modify The Provision In The 
Parties9 November 7 Contract Providing Him With A Minimum 
Term of 12 Months Employment By Signing The SWC Agreement 
In granting summary judgment against Plaintiff Giusti on his contract claims, the 
district court states that "the question ... was whether the final offer letter [referring to 
the December 16 Contract, Add. 5] signed after the [SWC] employment agreement [dated 
December 55 1999, Add. 6], modifies the [SWC] employment agreement by adding a 
definite term of employment for at least the first year." See, Order at 2, Add.3. Plaintiff 
Giusti respectfully submits that the district court erred by focusing on the wrong question. 
The germane question is whether the provisions of the SWC Employment Agreement 
[hereinafter "SWC Agreement", Add. 6], permitting SWC to terminate employment at 
any time, with or without cause, modified the parties' prior November 7 Contract, Add.4, 
which Plaintiff Giusti testified was intended by the parties to provide him with a 
minimum term of 12 months employment at SWC.4 Plaintiff Giusti contends that no 
such modification occurred because he never consented to such a modification. 
The November 7 Contract between Plaintiff Giusti and SWC is a bilateral 
contract. A bilateral contract for a specified term of employment cannot be unilaterally 
The November 7 Contract was consensually modified by a contract signed by Hyde 
and Giusti, hereinafter the "December 16 Contract", Add.5. Whereas the November 7 
Contract, Add. 4, provided that Giusti would receive " 1 % override of revenue produced 
by the sales people you manage in the sales systems area", the December 16 Contract 
increased Giusti's override to " 1 % override on [all] corporate revenue." Both contracts 
contain the identical provision Plaintiff Giusti testified was intended to provide him with 
a minimum term of 12 months employment at SWC. Neither Contract refers to the "SWC 
Agreement" which Plaintiff Giusti testified was not negotiated by the parties and claims 
was fraudulently induced. See, ^21-24, Statement of Facts, supra at 17-19. 
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modified by the employer to make the plaintiffs employment "at-will." Any 
modification of a bilateral contract requires the consent of both parties to the contract. 
"To alter, or supplant a contract fairly made, the same meeting of the minds is needed 
that was necessary to make the contract in the first place.... The burden of proof for 
showing the parties' mutual assent... is on the party claiming that there has been a 
modification." Harris v. IES Associates, Inc., 2003 UT App 112, ^ 46, 69 P.3d 297 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). See also, Malstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, 
290 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1955) ("It is hornbook law that one party to a bilateral contract 
cannot terminate it by unilateral action.") 
The district court admitted Plaintiff Giusti's evidence that the parties negotiated, 
agreed and intended to provide him with a minimum term of 12 months of employment at 
S WC in their November 7 Contract and that Giusti disclaimed any intent to modify the 
term of employment provided in the November 7 Contract prior to signing the SWC 
Agreement. {See, ^ j 11-12, 17-19, Statement of Facts, supra at 13-14, 15-17) However, 
in subsequently concluding that the SWC Agreement barred Giusti's contract claims 
based on the termination of his employment, the district court erred either by entirely 
discounting Giusti's evidence on these genuinely disputed issues of material fact, or by 
improperly weighing and resolving the parties' conflicting evidence on these disputed 
issues against Giusti. See, Order at 2-3, Add. 3. "When interpreting a contract, the 
intentions of the parties are controlling ... Although the terms of an instrument may seem 
clear to a judge, this does not rule out the possibility that the parties chose the language of 
the agreement to express a different meaning." Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 
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875 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah App. 1994), quoting Union Bank v. Swenson, 101 P.2d 663, 665 
(Utah 1985). 
Because genuinely disputed issues of material fact remain for trial on the issues of 
(1) whether the parties intended to provide Plaintiff Giusti with a minimum term of 12 
months employment at SWC, (2) whether Giusti intended to modify the parties' 
November 7 Contract by signing the SWC Agreement, and (3) whether Giusti was an 
employee for a specified term or an at-will employee, the district court's order granting 
summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiffs contract claims in Counts II-IV is incorrect 
and should be reversed and these claims remanded for trial. 
C. The District Court Erred In Granting Summary Judgment For SWC 
On Plaintiffs Contract Claims Where Genuinely Disputed Issues Of 
Material Fact Remain For Trial On The Issue Of Whether The SWC 
Agreement Was Fraudulently Induced 
Parol evidence is admissible to prove that a party was fraudulently induced into a 
written agreement, even if an agreement is integrated, that integration is complete, and 
the proffered parol evidence contradicts the terms of the agreement. Maack, at 574-575. 
Here, Plaintiff Giusti presented sworn testimony and evidence that he was fraudulently 
induced to sign the SWC Agreement. See, ^17-19, Statement of Facts, supra at 15-17. 
Although the district court admitted this evidence, the court subsequently erred either by 
discounting this evidence entirely, or by improperly resolving the parties' conflicting 
evidence on this claim against Giusti. Thus, the Court should reverse the district court's 
order granting summary judgment against Plaintiff Giusti on his contract claims in 
Counts II through IV. 
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D. The District Court Erred In Granting Summary Judgment On Plaintiff 
Giusti's Contract Claims Not Based On The Termination Of His Employment 
In dismissing all of Plaintiff Giusti's contract claims relating to the termination of 
his employment, See, Order at 2-3, Add.3, the district court also erred by failing to 
recognize that Plaintiff Giusti asserted claims in Counts II-IV for breach of contract, 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel unrelated to the termination of Plaintiff Giusti's employment.5 The 
district court did not discuss these claims and they are not barred under the district court's 
rationale for dismissing Plaintiffs other contract claims. 
Plaintiff Giusti claims that SunGard and SWC, by and through Hyde, Erickson and/or 
Greifeld, breached the parties' November 7 Contract, as modified by their December 16 
Contract, including the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the contract by: 
(1) SunGard's and SWC's refusal to pay Giusti six and one half months of the $7,500 per 
month draw or subsidy, and the commissions and the 1% override on corporate sales 
promised to him for 1999-2000, See, FAC, ffi[19(I, J), 1J21, Add. 16, R.64-65; (2) Hyde's 
and Erickson's failure to provide Plaintiff with basic information and data to use in 
training the new SWC sales team, making it difficult for Plaintiff to perform his duties, 
See, FAC, 1J39, Add. 16, R.71; (3) Hyde's conduct in communicating and directing 
employees under Plaintiff Giusti's supervision without notifying Giusti, thus 
undermining his authority to lead and direct the SWC sales team, See, FAC, 1fl[40, 
Add.16, R.71; (4) Hyde's and Erickson's malicious threats to terminate Giusti's 
employment "for cause" based on false and malicious charges to humiliate and intimidate 
Giusti into resigning or accepting a demotion to avoid the damages of a "for cause" 
termination on his professional reputation, See, FAC, ^43-44, Add. 16, R.72; (5) Hyde's 
and Erickson's arbitrary and malicious refusal to provide Plaintiff with information 
regarding their charges of unsatisfactory performance or to meet with Plaintiff to discuss 
the false and malicious charges they made against him. See, FAC, ^45-46, Add. 16, 
R.72-73; (6) Hyde and Erickson's malicious and deceitful conduct in leading Plaintiff to 
believe that SunGard was not expecting the new SWC sales team he was recruiting and 
training to produce the promised revenue for SunGard in 2000, while falsely and 
maliciously maligning Giusti to SunGard officials Greifeld and Gross, and blaming 
Giusti for SWC's failure to meet Hyde's 2000 revenue commitment to SunGard. See, 
FAC, Tf38, Add.16, R.70-71; 111152-56, Add. 16, R.74-76. 
39 
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's order 
granting summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiff Giusti's contract claims in Counts II 
through IV and remand these claims for trial on the merits. 
Ill THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT 
CLAIMS BASED ON PLAINTIFF'S PURPORTED FAILURE TO 
SHOW ANY DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE FRAUD 
The district court erred in granting summary judgment against Plaintiff Giusti on 
his claims in Count I against Defendants for fraudulently inducing him to leave his secure 
executive employment at Cambric and accept employment and employment contracts at 
SWC, based on the court's incorrect conclusion that Plaintiff failed to show any damages 
on this claim. See, Order dated April 21, 2006, Add.9, and Order dated November 16, 
2006, Add. 10. The district court based this incorrect Order on several incorrect 
conclusions of law. 
First based upon its incorrect conclusion that the S WC Agreement precludes 
Plaintiff Giusti from relying on SWC's representation of a specified term of employment 
in the parties November 7 Contract, the district court also erred in concluding that 
Plaintiffs claim for fraudulent inducement of his employment and employment contracts 
with SWC in Count I "would be fatal in light of language in the [SWC] employment 
agreement by which Plaintiff affirmatively acknowledges reliance upon only those terms 
expressed therein" such that Plaintiff Giusti could only claim damages for being 
fraudulently induced to leave his prior employment at Cambric. See, Order dated March 
30, 2002, at 3, Add. 3. The foregoing conclusions are incorrect because the SWC 
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Agreement allowed Plaintiff to rely on SWC's representation of a specified term of 
employment in the parties' prior November 7 Contract, as discussed in Point 11(A), supra, 
at 34-36, and because even if Giusti was an "at will" employee, which he disputes, an 
employee's "at-will" status, or the termination of his employment, or a merger clause, do 
not preclude an employee's recovery of damages for fraudulent inducement of his 
employment, because fraud in the inducement of an employment contract vitiates its 
enforcement to bar a fraudulent inducement claim as a matter of law. See, e.g., McConkey 
v. Aon Corp,, 804 A.2d 572, 587-591 (N.J. Super. 2002), (at-will status, termination of 
employment and merger clause); Berger v. Security Pacific Info. Systems, Inc., 795 P.2d 
1380, 1384 (Colo. App. 1990) (at-will status); OngInternational (U.S.A.) v. 11th Ave 
Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 451-453 (Utah 1993) (covenant of immunity or release). 
"In those jurisdictions that recognize the benefit of the bargain rule, the jury is 
permitted to infer that the plaintiff would have continued to work a reasonable time had 
the terminated opportunity been as successful as represented by the employer." See, 
McConkey, supra, at 589-591. Accordingly, the Court should reverse the district court's 
incorrect conclusion that Plaintiff Giusti is not entitled to recover damages resulting from 
the fraudulent inducement of his employment and employment contracts at SWC, 
including damages incurred after the termination of his employment at SWC, in addition 
to the damages he incurred as the result of being fraudulently induced to leave his prior 
employment at Cambric to accept employment at SWC. 
Second, under Utah law, a plaintiff who prevails on a claim for fraudulent 
inducement is entitled to "benefit of the bargain damages" representing the amount of 
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money the plaintiff would have received had the fraudulent representations made to 
induce the employment been true, together with all other non-duplicative consequential 
damages required to make the plaintiff whole, including punitive damages where 
compensatory or general damages are awarded. See, MUJI 17".11; Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 
424 P.2d 136, 137 (Utah 1967); Ong International (U.S.A.) v. 11th Ave Corp., 850 P.2d 
447, 456-457 (Utah 1993). Such damages include compensation for emotional distress, 
Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 Utah 89, ^[105, 65 P.3d 1134; 
Conder v. Williams andAssocs., 739 P.2d 634, 639-640 (Utah App. 1987) (Reversing 
district court decision limiting plaintiff claiming fraudulent inducement of employment to 
out of pocket damages). See also, Ps Mem Op MSJ, Point 1(C), R.3706-3710. 
Because the district court erred in its March 30, 2002 Order, Add. 3 at 2-3, by 
incorrectly limiting Plaintiff Giusti's fraudulent inducement claim to exclude the 
damages he incurred following the termination of his employment at SWC, the district 
court further erred in its subsequent Order dated April 21, 2006, Add.9, by entirely 
discounting the substantial record evidence Plaintiff Giusti presented concerning the 
consequential financial, reputation and emotional damages he incurred as the result of 
being fraudulently induced to accept employment and employment contracts at SWC, in 
erroneously concluding that Plaintiff Giusti failed to show damages on his fraudulent 
inducement claim in Count I and granting summary judgment against Plaintiff Giusti on 
this claim. Id.6 
6
 Plaintiff Giusti's evidence on damages included the report of his expert economist, 
Paul A. Randle, who calculated Plaintiffs past and future damages at between $11.9M 
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Third, in its Order dated April 21, 2006, Add.9, the district court states "The only 
claim of damages relating to the SWC contract would be for monies earned and not paid. 
There is no claim by the plaintiff that there is earned income that was not received." Id. at 
2-3. This conclusion is legally incorrect for the reasons discussed in Point II above, 
namely that Plaintiff Giusti had a minimum term of 12 months employment at SWC. This 
conclusion is also incorrect because Plaintiff Giusti claimed and presented evidence that 
he did not receive the six and one half months of non-recoverable monthly subsidy in the 
amount of $7,500 per month, the " 1 % of corporate revenue" in the amount of $225,000 
for the year 2000, and the license and service commissions on his personal accounts 
including Prudential, Equitable/AXA and State Farm, in the amount of $29,548 for 1999 
and $244,718 for the year 2000, owed to Giusti under the terms of the parties' November 
7 Contract as modified by their December 16 Contract. See, FAC, ^67-68, Add. 16, 
R.79-80; Randle Report on Damages, ^3 and Tables 6-7, Add. 19, R.3745-3746, 3758-
3759. This evidence creates another genuinely disputed issue of material fact on the issue 
of the damages incurred by Giusti as the result of the fraudulent inducement of his 
and $12.9M, including the loss of the salary, subsidy, benefits, 1% override on corporate 
revenue, commissions on Plaintiffs personal accounts including Prudential, 
Equitable/AXA and State Farm, and the bonuses, stock options, employee stock and 
other employee benefits Plaintiff would have received during his employment at SWC 
until retirement had the fraudulent representations Hyde and Erickson made to induce his 
employment and employment contracts at SWC been true. See, Randle Report On 
Damages, Add. 19, R.3743-3762. These calculations assume an offset for Giusti's 
earnings at Callware, his employer subsequent to the termination of his employment at 
SWC. Id. at fflj4-5, R.3746. See also, Statement of Facts, f !3, supra at 25-26. Plaintiff 
Giusti also presented substantial record evidence of additional consequential damages he 
incurred as the result of being fraudulently induced to leave his prior employment at 
Cambric. See, Id., [^42, Statement of Facts, supra at 24-25. 
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employment and employment contracts with SWC, precluding summary judgment on 
Plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claim in Count I. 
Fourth, in its Order dated April 21, 2006, Add.9, the district court further ruled 
that "Consistent with this Court's December 5, 1999, ruling7 ... the Court concludes that 
the appropriate measure of damages [under the SWC Agreement] on Mr. Giusti's claim 
for fraudulent inducement is the difference between what plaintiff earned at Cambric, his 
prior employment, and his subsequent earnings." See, Order at 1-2, Add. 9. Applying 
this incorrect measure of damages, the district court also incorrectly concluded that 
Plaintiff Giusti did not show any damages as the result of being fraudulently induced to 
leave his prior employment at Cambric because he purportedly earned the same basic 
salary at Cambric as he earned in his employment at Callware, following the termination 
of Plaintiff s employment at SWC. Id. at 2-3. This conclusion is incorrect because 
Plaintiff Giusti presented evidence that his starting annual base salary at Cambric was 
$125,000 and contractually due to increase to $135,000 a year in January 2000. See, 1J10, 
Statement of Facts, supra at 12-13. Plaintiff Giusti also presented evidence that his 
annual base salary at Callware was $125,000. Giusti Dep.650:15-651:4, R.2943,3022-
3023. Thus, contrary to the district court's conclusion, the salary earned by the Plaintiff at 
Callware was not the same salary he received at Cambric, See, Order at 2-3, Add.9, and 
demonstrates a loss of $10,000 per year in salary from January, 2000 until the time of 
7
 The record shows that there was no ruling on December 5, 1999. Indeed, the 
Complaint was not filed until July 10, 2000. Thus, Plaintiff assumes that the court is 
referring to its earlier Memorandum Decision and Order dated March 30, 2002, Add. 3, 
granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs contract claims in Counts II through IV and 
limiting Plaintiffs claim and damages for fraudulent inducement in Count I. 
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trial, even under the limited and incorrect measure of damages applied by the district 
court. (Emphasis supplied) 
Fifth, in its Order of April 21, 2006, Add.9, the district court acknowledges that 
Plaintiff Giusti incurred the loss of an $800 per month car allowance he received at 
Cambric and did not receive at SWC or Callware. However, the district court failed to 
consider this evidence in concluding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate any damages as 
the result of being fraudulently induced to leave his employment at Cambric. Id. at 3. For 
this additional reason, the district court erred in granting summary judgment against 
Plaintiff Giusti on Count I. 
Sixth, the district court also concluded that "While Mr. Giusti relies upon claims 
for potential bonuses from Cambric, such claimed damages are speculative at best and 
cannot be proven with the requisite 'reasonable certainty5 because they are tied to the 
company's future economic performance as well as the plaintiffs future performance." 
Id. at 2-3. This conclusion is incorrect because Plaintiff Giusti presented evidence that 
one of the $25,000 bonuses from Cambric had already been paid to him and another 
bonus was based only on easily attainable personal performance goals, See, TflO, 
Statement of Facts, supra at 12-13. This evidence creates a jury issue on whether Giusti 
would have received at least one more $25,000 bonus had he not left Cambric due to the 
defendants' fraudulent inducement. Thus, the district court erred in improperly resolving 
this genuinely disputed issue of fact against Plaintiff Giusti. See, Order at 3, Add.9. 
The district court's additional conclusion that "It is not the possible bonus income 
but the received income that establishes the measure for damages", See, Order at 3, 
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Add.9, is also incorrect and contrary to the "benefit of the bargain" measure of damages 
allowed for fraudulent inducement of employment under Utah law discussed above. 
Finally, the district court's conclusion that "it is incumbent upon Mr. Giusti to 
compare the income he earned post-Cambric [which would include both Plaintiff Giusti's 
earnings at SWC and Callware] with what he earned while employed there", See, Id., 
again misapprehends the nature of Plaintiff Giusti's fraudulent inducement claim and 
incorrectly places the burden to prove mitigation of damages on Plaintiff Giusti rather 
than on the Defendants. Plaintiff Giusti's earnings at Callware subsequent to his 
employment at SWC are only relevant to mitigate his damages from the alleged 
fraudulent inducement. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, Order at 3, Add.9, the 
burden to prove the affirmative defense of mitigation of damages is on the Defendants, 
not Plaintiff Giusti. "Mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense... [T]he burden is 
on the party whose wrongful act caused the damage to prove anything in diminution 
thereof." Pratt v. Bd o/Educ, 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977). "It is, after all, the 
wrongdoer, rather than the injured party, who should bear the burden of some uncertainty 
in the amount of damages. While the standard for determination of the amount of 
damages is not so exacting as the standard for proving the fact of damages there still must 
be evidence that rises above speculation and provides a reasonable, even though not 
necessarily precise, estimate of damages." Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. 
& Tel Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985). 
In order to recover damages for fraud, Plaintiff Giusti need only demonstrate 
"some injury or damage." Conder v. Williams andAssocs., 739 P.2d 634, 639-640 (Utah 
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App. 1987)(reversing summary judgment on fraud claim for purported failure to show 
damages); Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 145, 247 P.2d 273, 275 (1952). Because 
Plaintiff Giusti's evidence demonstrates that he incurred substantial damages even under 
the district court's incorrect measure of damages, the Court should reverse the district 
court's order granting summary judgment on Count I and remand Plaintiff Giusti's 
fraudulent inducement claims for trial on the merits with direction as to the proper 
measure of damages to be applied. 
IV THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGEMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE 
CLAIM AGAINST HYDE AND ERICKSON 
In granting Hyde and Erickson summary judgment on Plaintiff Giusti's intentional 
interference claim in Count V, the district court held that "when the defendants are 
employees of the organization that is the subject of the relationship at issue, the plaintiff 
must establish that the defendants were acting outside the scope of their employment for 
purely personal reasons." Order at 3, Add.8. (Emphasis supplied) Although the district 
court held that "[T]here is no question that Erickson and Hyde were employees of SWC," 
Plaintiff Giusti presented evidence that Hyde was an executive of SunGard at the time of 
Giusti's termination. See, Tfl3, Statement of Facts at 14. Thus, the district court erred by 
failing to consider this evidence or by improperly resolving the parties' conflicting 
evidence on this issue against Plaintiff Giusti. 
The district court also erred in concluding that "It is clear that the authority to 
terminate was within [the] scope of employment and there is no evidence to establish that 
the termination of the plaintiff was based solely on a personal motivation by either 
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Erickson or Hyde." Order at 4, Add.8. As this Court observed in Christensen v. Swenson, 
874P.2dl25, 127 (Utah 1994) 
[Wjhether an employee is acting within the scope of employment is 
ordinarily a question of fact. Id. The question must be submitted to a jury 
whenever reasonable minds may differ as to whether the [employee] was at 
a certain time involved wholly or partly in the performance of [the 
employer's] business or within the scope of employment. Id,, (quoting 
Carter v. Bessey, 97 Utah 427, 432, 93 P.2d 490, 493 (1939))." However, 
when the employee's activity is so clearly within or outside the scope of 
employment that reasonable minds cannot differ, the court may decide the 
issue as a matter of law. Id', Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 
1053,1057 (Utah 1989). 
In Christensen, the Court also refers to the three criteria provided in Birkner v. Salt 
Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989), for determining whether an employee is 
acting within or outside the scope of employment, namely: (1) whether the employee's 
conduct is the general kind the employee is hired to perform; (2) whether the employee's 
conduct occurs within the hours and ordinary spatial boundaries of employment, and (3) 
whether the employee's conduct is motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving 
the employer's interest. Id. at 127-129. 
In Clark v. Pangan, 2000 UT 37, 998 P.2d 268, this Court held that "[I]f the 
employee acts 'from purely personal motives ... in no way connected with the 
employer's interests'[,] ... the conduct should be considered outside the scope of 
employment." Id. at [^24, quoting Birkner, 111 P.2d at 1057; See also, Hodges v. Gibson 
Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156-157 (Utah 1991), "An employee's conduct is usually not 
in the scope of employment where the employee's motivation for the activity is personal, 
even though some transaction of business or performance of duty may also occur." 
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(Emphasis supplied); Crisman v. Hallows, 2000 UT App 104, THflO-13, 999 P.2d 1249 
(Evidence that defendant acted from purely personal motives sufficient to create a jury 
question precluding summary judgment.) Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that 
Hyde and Erickson had the authority to terminate Plaintiff Giusti's employment, such 
authority does not preclude Plaintiff Giusti's intentional interference claim against Hyde 
and Erickson, where Plaintiff presented substantial record evidence to show that Hyde 
and Erickson intentionally interfered with his existing and prospective economic relations 
o 
with SWC and SunGard solely for personal reasons. 
In concluding that "there is no evidence to establish that the termination of the 
plaintiff was based solely on a personal motivation by either Erickson or Hyde" as 
alleged by Plaintiff Giusti,9 Order at 4, Add.8, the district court erred by failing to 
consider Plaintiffs sworn testimony and evidence that Hyde and Erickson maliciously 
and intentionally interfered with his existing and prospective economic relations with 
SWC, SunGard and other potential employers, for the wholly personal reason of saving 
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, Order at 4, Add.8, the court in Lichtie v. 
U.S. Home Corporation, 655 F. Supp.1026 (D.Utah 1987) (Judge J. Thomas Greene) did 
not hold that a supervisory employee acting purely for personal reasons could not be held 
liable for intentional interference with the existing employment of an employee of the 
corporation. Rather, the court held that the plaintiff in that case failed to present sufficient 
evidence to raise a genuinely disputed issue of material fact on the issue, stating that "The 
only fact pointed to by plaintiffs in support of their theory that Wood's sole motivation 
was personal ... is a statement... taken out of context." Id. at 1028. 
9
 In his verified First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Giusti alleges that Hyde's and 
Erickson's intentional interference was done "maliciously, in bad faith, for personal 
reasons, without any legitimate business justification and outside the scope of their 
employment. See, FAC, ^34-49,61, Add. 16, R.69-74,77. 
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their own jobs and not for any legitimate business purpose of their employer. See, 1fl[25-
30, 34-41 (particularly ffl[35, 39), Statement of Facts, supra at 19-24. 
Because reasonable minds could differ as to whether Hyde and Erickson acted for 
exclusively personal reasons in intentionally interfering with Plaintiff Giusti's economic 
relationship with SWC, SunGard and other potential employers, based on the conflicting 
evidence presented by the parties, the Court should reverse the district court's summary 
judgment in favor of Hyde and Erickson on Plaintiff Giusti's claim for intentional 
interference in Count V and remand this claim for trial on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff Giusti respectfully requests that the Court 
reverse the district court's conclusions and orders granting summary judgment and 
dismissing Counts I-V of his First Amended Complaint against Defendants, reverse the 
district court's order dismissing SunGard as a defendant in this action, and remand this 
case for trial on the merits. Plaintiff also respectfully requests that the Court allow 
Plaintiff discovery regarding his claims against SunGard and instruct the district court 
regarding the correct measure of damages to be applied to Plaintiffs fraudulent 
inducement claims in Count I. 
DATED and respectfully submitted this 31st day of December 2007. 
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